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Abstract. The results reported in this paper suggest the possible operation of the Peter 
Principle in a large hierarchical financial sector firm. This result holds even after we 
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allows us to attribute the contributory factors for the observed fall in performance 
after a promotion. It appears that approximately 2/3 of the fall is due to the Peter 
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I   Introduction 
 
The famous Peter Principle, Peter and Hull (1969), states that “in a hierarchy 
every employee tends to rise to his level of incompetence”. This statement seems to 
be at odds with the conventional view of the function of promotions. Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) for example observe that “Promotions serve two roles in an 
organisation; first, they help assign people to the roles where they can best contribute 
to the organization’s performance; second, promotions serve as incentives and 
rewards”. The second part of this is the main message of Lazear and Rosen (1981).  
One question is whether one in fact needs to reconcile the Peter Principle with the first 
part of Milgrom’s and Roberts’ definition. 
  
The Peter Principle suggests that productivity might fall after a promotion. 
Lazear (2004) argues that this decreased performance is purely a statistical matter. 
Firms use promotion tournaments to assign workers to job slots within the 
organisation. The Peter Principle is a necessary by-product resulting from a regression 
to the mean effect in performance. This is discussed below in a simple tournament 
model. Here, promotion decisions are based on the level of output of an individual, in 
this paper we proxy output by worker’s performance evaluation scores. These 
performance evaluation scores will be a function of effort but also a stochastic error 
component. In the one-shot context the error component has zero expectation. Those 
who are promoted however are non-randomly selected out of the population of 
workers and correspondingly their errors are a non-random selection out of the 
distribution of errors. When workers are promoted on the basis of their performance, 
the workers selected for promotion tend to have experienced larger positive shocks to 
their performance than those not promoted.  The result of this is that the expectation 
of the error term conditional on promotion is greater than zero. After promotion the 
expected value of the error will revert to zero. It is this “reversion to the mean” effect 
which is the “Peter Principle” effect. 
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II   A Simple Model 
 
We follow a simple tournament model to illustrate the main point. Workers are 
characterised by a convex cost of effort function ( )C µ where µ is effort and 
'( ) 0C µ >  and ''( ) 0C µ > . Consider first two identical individuals 1 and 2, in this 
context, identical means simply they have the same cost function. As is well known 
following Lazear and Rosen (1981) if these two individuals compete for a promotion 
which will pay HW to the winner when they are both presently paid LW , then 
individual 1 (and symmetrically 2) will maximise his/her expected gain (assuming 
participation) 
 
1 2 1 2 1( , ) (1 ( , )) ( )H LW P W P Cµ µ µ µ+ − − µ    (1) 
 
Where 1 2( , )P µ µ  is the probability that individual 1 wins the tournament with 2. The 
first order condition for individual 1’s effort decision is then 
 
 
*
1 1
1
1
( ) '(H L
PW W C
µ µ
*)µµ =
∂− =∂      (2) 
 
where *µ  is the optimal amount of effort that individual 1 puts in.  
Since 1 2 1 2( , ) Prob( )P q qµ µ = >  where 1, 2i i iq iµ ε= + = .  Here q is output, which is 
the sum of effort iµ  and iε  a stochastic error with ( ) 0iE ε = . Rearranging this 
expression gives 
1 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2Prob( ) Prob( ) Prob( ) ( )q q Gµ ε µ ε ε ε µ µ µ µ> = + > + = − < − = −  where G 
is the CDF of 2 1ε ε− . This implies that 1 2
1
(P g )µ µµ
∂ = −∂ but since the two individuals 
are identical then in equilibrium they will act identically and 1 2* * *µ µ µ= = so (2) can 
be written 
 
 1( ) (0) '(H LW W g C *)µ− =      (3) 
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This first order condition contains the basic message of Tournament theory, that effort 
will increase as the size of prize, ( )H LW W−  increases, and as  increases, which 
indicates that the “importance of luck” decreases. 
(0)g
 
The Peter Principle follows from the following argument:- an individual who is 
promoted will have * *P P NP Nq q Pµ ε µ= + > = +ε (subscript p indicating “promoted” 
and “np” not pomoted). This implies P NPε ε>  and so it follows that 
( | ) 0P P NPE ε ε ε> > . A consequence of this is the Peter Principle, those who are 
promoted will have relatively “high”ε’s, subsequent realisations will have expectation 
0, therefore as Lazear (2004) points out, purely as a statistical matter expected 
performance will drop for those who are promoted. 
 
III Data 
 
The data we use comes from personnel records of all full-time employees of a 
large financial sector firm based in the UK covering the period January 1989 to 
November 2001 allowing for a potential total of 154 monthly observations for each 
employee in the firm. Although firm size varies over the period 1989 to 2001, the firm 
employs on average 40,000 full-time employees and 20,000 part-time employees in 
any given year. The personnel records include a unique identifier for each observation 
and amongst others information on salary, bonuses, commissions, performance 
ratings, promotions, hierarchical grade, regional area of employment, absence, exit 
reasons, age, gender, marital status, number of children, ethnic origin, schooling and 
internal qualifications is also available.  
 
 Individuals’ performance is evaluated on an annual basis within the firm. The 
scale used is 5 “Outstanding”, 4 “High”, 3 “Good”, 2 “Improvement required” and 1 
if “Unsatisfactory”. Performance evaluations are completed by worker’s line 
managers. Table 1 give some summary statistics on performance ratings. The means 
reported are of the ratings of the workers in the grade they occupied when promoted. 
 
The internal hierarchy of this firm as discussed in detail in Treble, et al. (2001) 
consists of 14 levels or grades. Two of these grades are classified as either un-graded 
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staff (S00) or un-graded managers (M00). The remaining 12 grades can be broadly 
categorised as training grades, clerical grades, middle managers and senior managers 
as suggested by Treble et al. (2001). “In house” the firm refers to these 12 grades, 
moving from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy, as induction grade (S01), junior 
staff grades (S02 and S03), senior staff grades (S04 and S05), junior management 
grades (M93 and M94), middle management grade (M95), senior management grade 
(M96) and the executive management (M97-M99).  
 
For the purpose of this analysis we have chosen to ignore movements in and 
out of the un-graded staff (S00) and managerial grades (M00). The reason for this is 
twofold. First, observed movements from staff grades into the un-graded staff grade 
can either be a promotion or a demotion. This also holds true if this movement is 
observed for managers moving in or out of the un-graded managerial grade. Again, 
we are unable to distinguish between a promotion and demotion in this case. 
Secondly, although movements out of S00 into managerial grades are identifiable as a 
promotion, it is difficult to identify the specific grade within staff grades that an 
individual has moved out of. Therefore identification of the magnitude of the ‘jump’ 
is impossible. We also exclude S02 as this is most closely defined as a training grade, 
progression out of this grade will be automatic as long as the worker attains basic 
standards, see Treble et al (2001) for further discussion on this point, and won’t be 
really competitive in the sense of a tournament. 
 
Table 1  Means of main variables for the sample of promoted individuals 
Grade 
Performance 
Rate 
(0)g?  Pay Spread 
S03(N=1980) 3.6707 0.0106 1934.94 
S04(N=1533) 3.4997 0.0066 2025.26 
S05 (N=786) 3.4262 0.0055 3724.83 
M93(N=836) 3.3900 0.0055 3502.51 
M94(N=453) 3.4724 0.0043 5888.82 
M95(N=101) 3.8911 0.0034 6391.94 
M96 (N=34) 4.0588 0.0025 8477.56 
M97 (N=11) 4.0909 0.0019 14484.77 
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 We also omit the top two executive management grades due to the paucity of 
observations. Of course , on which we are reporting means in the above table 
isn’t directly observable in the data. We will now describe our method of measuring 
this. 
(0)g?
 
IV Measuring - the “Importance of Luck” (0)g?
 
One of the main contributions of this paper is that we account for changes in 
the incentives which face individuals as they move up the hierarchy in evaluating the 
“Peter Principle”, to do this we need to be able to calculate the (change in the) pay 
spread brought about by the event of promotion. We calculate this as the difference 
between the pay spread after promotion ( )2grade gradew w+ − 1+  and the pay spread before 
promotion ( )1grade gradew w+ − , where gradew  denotes the mean pay within the worker’s 
current grade, and gradew the workers actual pay.  This is reasonably straight-forward, 
however gauging the change in ‘importance of luck’  is arguably more difficult. 
To do this we need to be able to characterise the promotion structure, so that the 
individual can be able to work out the effect of a change in their performance rating 
on their promotion prospects, but we need to do this in such a way as we can regard 
the link as exogenous. If we estimated both the promotion relationship and the effort 
relationship within the same period then we would face problems of endogeneity, 
since both effort and the things affecting if are potentially being determined in the 
same period. To circumvent this problem we estimate the promotion relationship in 
the prior two-year period 1989-90 and then the performance relationship subsequently 
during the two year period 1991-92.     
(0)g
 
To take account of possible variation in the “importance of luck” we follow a 
method outlined in Audas, Barmby and Treble (2004) and measure  by firstly 
estimating a promotion Logit and then differentiating this with respect to the measure 
of effort. Writing the promotion Logit can be as
(0)g?
( ; ) ( )i i i iG pr X L X prψ θ′∆ = + ∆ where L 
is the logistic function ipr∆  is the difference between the workers performance rating 
(our measure of effort) and the mean performance rating of the grade the worker is in 
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___
ii i l
pr pr pr∆ = − , X is a set of other regressors which also affect the probability of 
promotion . Differentiating this expression with respect to ipr  (our measure of effort), 
and setting ipr∆ equal to zero gives our estimator for : (0)g?
 
 (0) ( )Gg L
pr
θ ψ∂ y′ ′= =∂ ??                       (4) 
 This estimated Logit is reported in table 2. The  difference which we will use in 
the performance equation being computed as the imputed  for the individual in 
the grade above the one the worker is in minus the computed  of the individual 
for the grade he/she is in 
(0)g?
(0)g?
(0)g?
Table 2:  Promotion Logit for computation of computed over the period 1989-
1990, during which time there were 902416 person months.  
(0)g?
 
Variable Coeff. S.E. 
Constant -1.4785 0.0413 
pr∆  0.6973 0.0727 
pr∆ *Gender -0.3016 0.0372 
pr∆ *Grade 0.00003 0.0121 
Grade -0.2446 0.0083 
Gender -0.4104 0.0192 
Age -0.0420 0.0013 
LnL -66312.933 
 
The estimated had mean 0.007555, with standard deviation 0.005895, minimum 
value 0.000562 and maximum 0.03494.  
(0)g?
 
V  Results 
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We analyse the performance ratings and the way they change after promotions 
during a two year period 1991-2, and during this interval of time we observe 5734 
promotions. 
 
In a first instance it would be useful to check whether the underlying effort 
equation which Tournament theory suggests is mirrored in the data, to do this we 
regress the performance ratings in levels on payspreads and measures of . (0)g?
 
 
Table 3 Regression of Performance Rating levels on Pay Spreads and  (0)g?
 
Variable Coeff. S.E. 
Constant 3.2306 0.0266 
Pay Spread 0.0000177 0.0000026 
(0)g?  37.4648 2.9732 
 
 
the coefficients of both variables are positive and  significant - so it appears that the 
pattern of relationships implied by Tournament theory are reflected in the data.  
Workers do appear to supply more effort in response to larger prizes (pay spreads) 
and in response to lower importance of luck. 
 
To evaluate whether the Peter Principal effect is actually observed in this firm 
at the individual level we define as our dependent variable the difference between post 
(one year later) and pre promotion performance rating computed for each individual 
promoted. Lazear (1999) computes a similar variable using a two year difference. The 
reason for the difference theoretically is that individuals will take time to learn a new 
job role. There is also a practical constraint in so far as, in the data, we will have to 
wait before we observe a current performance rating in the data, by 1 year almost all 
promoted individuals will have received a new rating, by two years we will start to 
lose individuals because of turnover.  
 
Regressing this difference on a constant would potentially reveal the existence 
of a Peter Principle effect if we could be sure that optimal effort levels were equal pre 
and post promotion. Optimal effort levels would remain unchanged if the conditions 
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determining workers effort responses remained unchanged. Tournament theory tell us 
that pay spread (“prize”) and g(0) are factors which positively influence effort levels. 
However there is no a priori reason why these quantities, and therefore the optimal 
effort levels, would remain constant over the hierarchy. 
  
To account for this potential variation in effort between levels of the hierarchy, 
we follow the central predictions of tournament theory, Lazear and Rosen (1981) that 
effort levels of workers are determined by the pay spreads they face and by g(0) “the 
importance of luck” they face. In a similar way to the method used in Audas, Barmby 
and Treble (2004) we enter a measure of the difference in pay spreads faced by 
workers as they are promoted between grades. These pay spreads are computed in the 
following way; the first pay spread (that is the pay spread he/she presently faces) is 
computed as the difference between the mean real basic pay of the grade immediately 
above minus the actual real basic pay for the worker in the grade he/she is in. The pay 
spread the worker will face once promoted is estimated as the mean real basic pay of 
two grades above where the worker is minus the mean pay of the grade immediately 
above. The same approach is used to ensure that the variation in performance after 
promotion is not due to changes in g(0), g(0) is predicted for each individual in each 
grade and the appropriate difference computed. 
 
 
Table 4 Regression of Difference in Performance Rating on Difference Pay Spreads 
and Difference in ’s (0)g?
 
Variable Coeff ( |t| ) Coeff. (|t|) 
Constant -0.1471 (15.55) 
-0.0923 
(4.24) 
Diff Pay Spread  0.00000762 (2.89) 
Diff  (0)g?  46.9368 (4.26) 
 
 
 
The above results indicate that, holding variation in tournament incentives constant, 
the Peter Principle effect appears to hold. The introduction of the change in the 
incentives which the individual faces makes a difference, as one would expect. The 
mean fall of 0.14 of a point in performance that is observed after one year is, it 
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appears partly due to a weakening of incentives, as holding incentives constant the 
mean fall in performance drops to 0.09.  
 
 
V  Concluding Remarks 
 
The results reported here are preliminary, however we argue that they are 
suggestive of the possible operation of the Peter Principle in the organisation we 
study. This results holds even after we allow for possible variation in optimal effort 
over stages in the hierarchy, using a method suggested in Audas, Barmby and Treble 
(2004). The method allows us to attribute approx 2/3 of the fall in performance due to 
the Peter Principle and 1/3 to lessening incentives. 
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